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Consumer Protection

Does Product Liability
Make Us Safer?
Adverse consequences arise from problems with the judicial
system and jurors’ judgment biases.
By W. Kip Viscusi Vanderbilt University

T

ort liability for personal injuries and property damage caused by products is known as product liability.
Among the most prominent products associated with
product liability claims are pharmaceuticals, medical
devices, private aircraft, automobiles, and cigarettes.
Damages awarded to injured parties raise the costs of providing the product, thus increasing the costs to the firm of selling
unsafe products. In theory, where the damages equal the value
of the harm, the damages payment leads the firm to internalize the costs of the harm and creates incentives for the firm
to produce safer products. In this article I focus primarily on
whether American product liability law does in fact enhance
product safety.
Posing the question of whether product liability law is safetyenhancing does not, however, imply that this framing of the
mission of product liability is appropriate. Higher levels of safety
may not be desirable. For almost all products, it does not make
economic sense to ensure that products are risk-free. Rather,
from the standpoint of economic efficiency, for continuous safety
choices the penalties established through tort liability should
provide financial incentives for firms to provide the products
that achieve a level of risk that equates the incremental benefits of
greater safety with the incremental costs. Thus, if the safety level

W. Kip Viscusi is the University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management at Vanderbilt University.
This article is taken from the paper “Does Product Liability Make Us
Safer?” that Viscusi contributed to the forthcoming book The American
Illness, Frank Buckley (ed.), Yale University Press, 2012.
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of the product falls short of the efficient level, product liability
can potentially play a productive role by penalizing firms for a
shortfall between the level of product safety provided and the
efficient level of safety, thus pushing the level of safety closer to
its efficient level.
This task of establishing efficient incentives for product
safety is not limited to a point in time. As technological change
evolves over time, firms should continue to improve their products to maintain this benefit-cost balance. Technological change
generally will lead to enhanced safety levels in any given product
if the changes involve innovations that decrease the costs of
providing safer products. If the cost of providing a given level
of safety decreases, then the firm will find it efficient to improve

Illustration by Morgan Ballard

the safety of the product.
However, technological change also may lead to the introduction of new products posing novel risks. Whether product liability will make products safer is a question that should be framed
more broadly in terms of whether product liability also fosters
the introduction of welfare-enhancing new products. The court’s
task of assessing innovative products often entails more problematic judgments than with assessments of existing technologies,
so that the concern for safety with respect to innovations may in
fact stymie such innovations. Novel products may be safer than
existing products but may pose new kinds of risks. If there is a
bias of product liability against novel risks, then there will be a
disincentive with respect to product innovations.
A review of the empirical evidence and case studies on the
role of product liability demonstrates that the idealized world
in which the tort liability system is supposed to produce effi-

The Efficient Safety Reference Point
In a simple economic framework in which firms have constant
unit costs of production, providing products with a higher level
of safety will result in a higher level of unit costs for the product. In the case of competitive markets, the additional costs
associated with safer products will raise unit cost levels, which
in turn will raise the price of the product purchased by consumers by an amount equal to the cost of greater safety. Thus
consumers are, in effect, purchasing a product liability insurance policy as part of a bundled product. Whether consumer
welfare is enhanced by greater safety or whether the additional
safety is excessive from consumers’ standpoint depends on
whether consumers value the safety improvements more than
the increased product price.
The role of product liability law in the economy should be

cient levels of safety is not how product liability law actually
performs. As I will demonstrate, the report card on the performance of product liability law is mixed. In some instances tort
liability does serve a potentially risk-reducing role by fostering
new safety measures. However, the safety-enhancing role of
liability fails to be realized in general because of fundamental
deficiencies in product liability law and the way such cases are
handled by the courts. In particular, courts make excessive and
unpredictable awards and stumble when faced with uncertainties. New products posing uncertain risks are especially hard hit
so that product liability often serves as a barrier to innovations
that would reduce accidents.

quite selective, since market forces will foster safer products so
that safety levels are not generally awry. Indeed, there is no useful
function of product liability law if markets function perfectly. In
a well-functioning market, firms will deliver products that have
an efficient level of safety even in the absence of product liability
law. This result assumes that consumers are fully informed of the
risks and consequences of their product choices, in which case
consumer preferences as expressed in the marketplace will generate
the desired mix of products and levels of safety that reflect consumers’ valuation of the risk and consequently the associated benefits
of safety. If safer products are desirable, consumers will be willing
to pay more for these products and companies will produce them.
Spring 2012
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For product liability law to serve a constructive role from the
standpoint of setting the efficient level of product risk, there
must be some form of market failure, such as inadequate consumer knowledge of the risks. The presence of product-related
injuries is not sufficient for concluding that there is an inadequate level of safety. In a typical personal injury case with an
identifiable victim, the probability of harm may appear to be 1.0
ex post since the consumer was in fact injured, but what matters
is the level of the risk ex ante across the entire population of consumers of the product. In judging whether there is a shortcoming
in risk beliefs, the task is to ascertain what a reasonable consumer
would have anticipated as the probability of harm, not whether
the injured consumer was clairvoyant and anticipated that there
would definitely be an injury.
Whether risk beliefs are accurate depends both on the level of
the risk and the degree to which people have information about
the risk. Certainly it is rarely the case that people know the exact
probabilities of harm from different products. Products often
pose multiple risks, and understanding all these hazards may
require detailed technical expertise. However, the appropriate
task for consumers is to have a sufficient understanding of
the multiple risks of the product so that they would assess the
expected cost imposed by the harms as being as severe as they
would in a situation of perfect information.
That consumers do not have perfect risk beliefs does not necessarily imply that there is a market failure. Errors in risk beliefs
are not random. Many systematic patterns have been identified
in the empirical literature on risk beliefs. A pertinent empirical
phenomenon is that people tend to overestimate small mortality
risks, such as the risk of dying from botulism, and underestimate
very large risks, such as the lifetime risk of heart disease from all
causes. For the most part, product risks tend to involve small
probabilities of serious adverse outcomes, and consequently
people will exhibit a tendency toward risk overestimation of
product-related risks.
Problems of risk underestimation will be more pronounced
for hidden risks. The presence of benzene in Perrier that was
discovered in 1990 is a well-known example of a risk that had
formerly been hidden, but this is not a unique situation. Medical
patients may not be aware of adverse drug interactions that are not
disclosed to the patient and cannot be determined by the patient
based on personal experience or other information sources. The
locus of areas in which government regulation or product liability
can play a constructive role will depend on the nature of the risk
and what consumers know about the risk. In particular, if there is
asymmetric information in which the manufacturer is informed
but consumers are not, then government regulation—such as
required disclosure of information—may be warranted.

Liability Criteria
The first question is when liability should be imposed, and this
will depend on the context of the product’s use. For concreteness, I will concentrate on products purchased by a consumer
26
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in a market context, where the potential injury is to the consumer. Whether consumers understand the risk to themselves
is a pivotal concern. Consumers will be willing to pay less for
products that may cause them harm. Products may also injure
third parties who are not involved in a business relationship
with the producer. Thus defective brakes or acceleration problems with a car could lead to harm to pedestrians or other drivers’ vehicles. To the extent that these harms are subsequently
internalized by the product purchaser through tort liability,
the consumer in turn will incorporate the cost of such harms
in the purchase decision. There can, of course, be exceptional
cases that are not adequately addressed either by the market
or tort liability, as when firms scale back tort liability claims
through bankruptcy proceedings.
The structure of standard liability rules can potentially lead to
efficient levels of safety. Under a negligence standard, firms will
only be liable for product-related injury costs if the level of safety
that they provide is below the legal standard. If that standard is
set at the economically efficient level of safety for the product,
the failure to meet the standard will lead firms to pay injured
parties for the cost of the accident, leading the firm to internalize these costs, which in turn will provide subsequent incentives
for the firm to provide products with levels of safety that meet
the standard.
The economic analysis for strict liability is simpler as there is
no need to set the standard at an efficient level. Since firms will
pay for all accident costs, the firm internalizes all safety losses
associated with the product and consequently will provide an
efficient level of safety. However, consumers will not have any
incentive to exercise care, to choose safe products, or to match
their product choices with their own safety-related productivity if all accident costs are borne by the firm. Standard law and
economics prescriptions generally couple strict liability with a
contributory negligence standard.

Liability and Risk Trends
The rise of product liability costs and, in particular, the emergence of occasional product liability “crises” would be consistent with an underlying soundly functioning liability regime
if an increase in product risks accounted for the high liability
costs. However, by almost every measure the United States has
become safer over the past century and accident rate trends
bear no apparent relation to surges in liability costs. Total unintentional injury death rates have declined for over a century.
Data going back almost a century are available for individual
component risks such as work-related deaths, home-related
deaths, accidental deaths from firearms, and other risks, and
these hazards also have declined from their levels 80 years ago.
The principal exception is that the number of motor-vehicle
deaths and motor-vehicle death rates are higher than they
were a century ago. However, the number of cars in use and the
usage of these cars have risen dramatically over time. Adjusting for intensity of use, motor-vehicle risks have plummeted

from 33.38 deaths per 10,000 vehicles in 1913 to 1.51 deaths
The profitability problems of insurance are more pronounced for
per 10,000 vehicles in 2008. Similarly, the death rate per 100
bodily injury coverage, as is the variability in loss ratios, which in
million miles has decreased from 21.65 in 1923 to 1.33 in 2008.
turn will create more highly variable premiums and uncertainty
Despite the high levels of safety and continued improvements
for the affected industries.
in safety, product-related insurance costs remain high. The value
The high loss ratios and substantial variability of loss ratios
of net premiums in 2008 was $1.3 billion for aircraft liability, $2.8
for bodily injury coverage in the 1980s contributed to the tort
billion for product liability and $38.6 billion for other liability
liability crisis of that era. Insurers responded by raising insurincluding industry coverages for negligence, carelessness, or failance rates and, in some extreme instances, denying coverage. In
ure to act. Many large firms also self-insure so that examination
addition, to the extent that the fluctuation in insured losses
of insurance premiums alone
understates the cost of product
liability to firms throughout
Longer-term trends in liability reflect factors other
the economy.
Longer-term trends in liabil- than safety levels alone. As society has become
ity reflect factors other than wealthier, we have become less willing to accept risk.
safety levels alone. As society
has become wealthier, we have
become less willing to accept
risk. Advances in technology also can increase liability levels if
reflects loss trends more generally, the uninsured costs will
the standards for what constitutes reasonable care have changed.
exhibit similar fluctuations.
These long-run trends do not, however, account for very
After the passage of a series of tort liability reforms in the midabrupt shifts in the level of liability. A puzzle noted by law pro- 1980s to contain damage awards, insurance loss ratios stabilized.
fessor George Priest is that, within specific time periods in which
For general liability, there were widespread reform efforts as 12
product liability premiums have exhibited sharp increases, there
states enacted reforms to control liability costs in 1985, 22 states
is no apparent increase in product risk levels to account for the
enacted reforms in 1986, and 12 states enacted reforms in 1987.
increase. There is therefore a mismatch between the surges in
Whereas general liability loss ratios formerly had exceeded 1.0,
liability costs associated with the tort liability crisis in the midin 1986 and subsequent years loss ratios decreased to levels that
1980s and the level of product-related risks. The periodic upward
stabilized around 0.8.
shifts in liability costs bear no apparent relation to increased
The costs of liability imposed on insurers are but one manifeslevels of product riskiness.
tation of the costs borne by firms. To assess the liability costs for
The problems posed by product liability insurance are related
firms, Joni Hersch and I undertook a stock market event study
both to the level of liability insurance costs and their variability,
of 29 product liability lawsuits. Such studies seek to determine
which creates substantial uncertainty for the firm. The absence
statistically the effect of different events, such as major court
of predictable liability costs will make it difficult for firms to
decisions, on a firm’s stock price after taking into account longerdistinguish which safety investments are worthwhile and which
run trends and other factors. The awards against companies were
are not. This problem is much more acute for bodily injury losses
associated with a significant decline in stock market price relative
than property losses. The main index of insurer profitability is
to similar firms. It is also noteworthy that newspaper reports of
the loss ratio, which is the ratio of losses to premiums. Ignoring
pending lawsuits also led to negative returns as investors began
the role of interest earned on premiums that are invested, a loss
to anticipate the adverse effects of product liability.
ratio above 1.0 implies that the insurer is losing money, and a loss
ratio below 1.0 implies that the insurer is making money on the
Innovation and New Product Development
policies it has written. Thus the loss ratio is an inverse measure
of insurer profitability. The bodily injury component of liability
The costs imposed by product liability law might serve a useexhibited much higher loss ratios and more variable loss ratios
ful deterrence function if they provide incentives for firms to
than did the property damages component throughout the
change their products to make them safer or for firms to disliability crisis period.
continue products that are so unsafe that they should not be
In a competitive market that has reached long-run equilib- marketed. These effects flow from the basic economic theory
rium, one would expect insurer profitability as measured by the
and the structure of product liability law. However, the presinsurance loss ratios to be equalized across industries and for
ence of substantial uncertainty in liability costs will tend to
different kinds of insurance coverage—assuming other reason- mute these effects, and there is no assurance that jury decisions
able conditions are met, including a similar distribution over
will provide the right signals to firms.
time in the occurrence of the losses. However, there is evidence
Determining whether and how product liability affects prodof substantial variation in terms of the level of the loss ratios
uct design are empirical issues, and the results are not encouragas well as the variability across industries and within industries.
ing. A useful proxy for assessing whether product liability law
Spring 2012
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enhances product safety is to see if it stimulates the development
of new, possibly safer products. There have been two regression analysis studies at the firm level of the overall relationship
between product liability and product innovation, neither of
which found effects that supported the textbook paradigm of
higher liability costs fostering the introduction of safer products. Similarly, there has been one regression analysis study of
decreases in the role of product liability and it showed that such
changes did not undermine safety but instead may have had the
opposite effect.
Novel risks have been found to be harder hit by liability costs
than more familiar hazards. Michael J. Moore and I examined the
effect of product characteristics on liability costs as well as the
effect of liability costs on research and development. Industries
that have a high rate of technological change or that have a high
patent rate have high shares of liability costs relative to sales for
the firm. In contrast, industries where the firms have made no
new product introductions have lower bodily injury liability costs.
These relationships are consistent with the view that the courts
dislike novel technologies.
The study also found that increased product liability has
a nonlinear effect on innovation. Low levels of liability boost
investments in novel technologies, but this effect tapers off and
eventually becomes reversed and turns negative at very high levels
of bodily injury costs relative to sales. Thus, at very high levels of
liability costs, product liability has a counterproductive effect.
A subsequent study by the same authors, using a different
measure of effects on innovation, found that liability costs
initially boost product research and development but then subsequently decrease R&D at very high levels of liability costs. The
liability costs/sales variable is associated with higher product
R&D investments at low levels of costs, but it eventually becomes
reversed for high liability costs. Sorting out causality remains difficult, but the evidence is suggestive of a positive relation between
liability costs and safety that holds only for low levels of costs.
These results suggest that product liability’s aversion to new
technologies has been harmful. At substantial levels of liability
costs, the net effect of liability is to shut down innovation and
discourage new product introductions. This is not the case at
low and moderate levels of liability costs, where product liability promotes R&D for new products and leads to new product
introductions. However, even here new product introductions
may not be warranted on benefit-cost grounds. This is because
it is not clear whether consumers would be willing to pay the
extra cost for the safety improvements. We lack data to permit
such judgments on an overall basis. What we do know is that
extremely high liability costs appear to have counterproductive
effects as they impose substantial costs but discourage changes in
products and new product research. Withdrawing products from
the market or choosing not to introduce new products often
becomes the most desirable course in the presence of substantial
expected liability costs.
New safety technologies should of course be encouraged,
and these results are therefore troubling. If product liability was
28
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meant to reduce risk, it seems to have failed in its mission. Strikingly, one study found that reducing tort liability makes us safer.
An empirical analysis by Paul Rubin and Joanna Shepherd found
that the enactment of noneconomic damages caps and product
liability reform were among the measures associated with a
decrease in the non–motor vehicle accidental death rate over the
1981–2000 period for states that implemented those measures as
compared to states that did not. On balance, tort reform led to a
reduction of 24,000 deaths over the two-decade period. Reductions in liability costs enhance safety.

Punitive Damages
Punitive damages often combine two elements that tend to
reduce the efficacy of product liability as a safety incentive promotion device. The awards often tend to be very large. As we saw,
very large damages amounts tend to have a counterproductive effect in that they serve to reduce R&D on new products,
diminish new product introductions, and lead to withdrawal of
more novel or risky products from the market. The second difficulty with punitive damages is their tremendous uncertainty
and unpredictability. If firms cannot anticipate what financial
sanctions they will incur for various product designs, there will
not be the clearcut incentive guidance needed to foster efficient
risk levels.
The enormous scale and financial uncertainty associated with
punitive damages is borne out in “blockbuster punitive damages
awards,” or punitive damages awards of at least $100 million. As
of 2008 there had been 100 such awards that reached or exceeded
the $100 million threshold. Even within the blockbuster punitive
damages award grouping, there is tremendous variability in the
award amounts, which reach as high as $145 billion in Engle v. R.J.
Reynolds, a cigarette class action case in Florida.
These awards do not reflect any sense of what is appropriate from the standpoint of establishing efficient levels of safety.
Although law-and-economics models generally envision a deterrence role for punitive damages only in cases with a probability
of detection below 1.0 (where compensatory damages might not
adequately deter because some harms are undetected), punitive awards bear little relation to any meaningful principles for
establishing safety incentives. To the extent that the awards are
designed by jurors to punish the company or “send it a message,”
there will be associated fixed costs incurred by the company, but
these awards tend not to impose the kinds of costs that can be
reflected in the expected costs of production and hence will not
serve as a safety incentive mechanism.
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the distribution of the blockbuster punitive damages awards. With the exception of seven
awards for violent crimes, the defendant in these blockbuster
cases is a firm in one of the designated industry groups. Most of
the industry cases are product-related. There are, of course, some
notable exceptions, such as awards for fraud against the finance,
investment, and insurance industry group, and the award for
the Exxon Valdez oil spill that affects the energy and chemical

able punitive damages awards has attracted the attention of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court’s decision in State Farm v.
Campbell suggested that there be a single-digit upper bound on
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and
for maritime cases the Court subsequently suggested a usual
upper bound ratio of 1:1 in Exxon Shipping Co. et al. v. Baker. These
guidelines are not necessarily binding and they do not serve to
put punitive damages on fully rational footing. As with all such
soft or binding caps, the proposal that there be some kind of rigid
mathematical structure that is not informed by a sound basis for
setting punitive damages does not address the more fundamental
problem that juries do not have guidelines for mapping their
concerns into dollar damages amounts.
A series of experimental studies by Cass Sunstein et al. has
documented numerous shortcomings in jury behavior, some of
which will be discussed below with respect to specific problems
that arise with respect to product liability cases. But the fundamental problem is that juries are being asked to determine
whether punitive damages are warranted and, if so, to set the
magnitude of these awards without any specific guidance as to
how their assessment of the defendant’s behavior should relate
to the dollar value of the award.
As with product liability generally, whether punitive damages do have a deterrent effect ultimately is an empirical question. In an examination of differences in risk levels between
states that permit punitive damages awards and those that do
not, I found no evidence of such a deterrent influence. The risk
categories examined included toxic chemical accidents, toxic
chemical accidents involving injury or death, toxic chemical
releases, surface water discharges of chemicals, total chemical
releases in surface water, medical misadventure deaths, total
accidental deaths, total insurance premiums, medical malpractice insurance premiums, product liability
premiums, and other liability premiums.
Table 1
The examination of an extensive set of
Damage Awards
risks that potentially could be influenced
Blockbuster punitive damages and the ratio of punitive damages to
by punitive damages reveals no statistically
compensatory damages by industry type.
significant deterrent effect.

industry tally. However, most of the industry group awards can
be traced to product-related risks.
The automobile, cigarette, and pharmaceutical awards all
involve products. While one automobile case (BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore) involved the repainting of car doors, the other cases
involved deaths and serious injuries associated with motor vehicles.
Because these cases tended to involve claims of design defects for
which the risks were not apparent at the time of sale, the liability
costs associated with these punitive damages could not be internalized. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that firms would
anticipate punitive damages awards in excess of $100 million.
The five blockbuster awards against the cigarette industry
that are shown in Table 1 are all for individual smoker harms.
The class action case in the outlier Engle award is the sixth
blockbuster case affecting the cigarette industry, and is not
included in Table 1 since it is such a large award that it would
distort the mean award levels. Because there is a latency period
of decades before smoking risks become apparent, the cigarettes
involved in these cases were marketed long before there were
any such blockbuster punitive damages awards, as the first such
blockbuster punitive damages award in any context was in 1985.
Moreover, since the cigarette industry had never paid damages
in any smoking case until after the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement, firms would not have incorporated the subsequent
liability costs into the product price at the time of sale since the
costs presumably were not anticipated at the time of sale. Thus,
from the standpoint of safety incentives, there is a mismatch
between the imposition of the blockbuster punitive damages
awards and the formation of corporate expectations and product safety decisions that could ultimately affect the likelihood
and level of such awards.
The tremendous uncertainty posed by large and unpredict-

Industry Involved

Number of
Punitive
Damages
Awards

Automobile
1

Cigarette

Mean Punitive
Damages

(Millions of
$2008)

Mean
Compensatory
Damages

(Millions of
$2008)

Mean Ratio of
Punitive to
Compensatory
Damages

9

900.71

160.89

19.12

5

10,240.92

2,078.87

11,125.31

Energy, Chemical

25

1,531.59

701.61

90.09

Finance, Investment, Insurance2

23

546.33

222.45

59.20

Pharmaceuticals,
Health Care

16

503.69

109.29

40.98

7

350.05

114.49

19.87

15

273.63

103.00

13.82

Violent Crime
Other
1

All columns exclude the Engle award.

2

The mean ratio excludes Garamendi v. Altus Finance S.A., which has zero compensatory damages.

Source: “The Changing Landscape of Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards,” by Alison F. Del Rossi and W. Kip Viscusi.
American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 12 (2010), Table 2.

Uncertainty, Hindsight Bias,
and New Products
As we saw, product liability costs are particularly likely to affect new products and
to discourage new product introductions
when liability costs are high. This differential burden on new products can be
traced to a series of contributing factors
in terms of how people perceive uncertain risks, such as the hazards posed by
new products, as compared to comparable
risks from existing products for which the
risks are better known.
One source of bias can be traced to
Spring 2012
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ambiguity aversion. In the classic Ellsberg paradox, people would
prefer a known probability of winning a prize to an uncertain
probability of the same magnitude. Subsequent work has shown
that in the case of people facing losses, precisely understood
probabilities of the loss are viewed as less harmful than less well
understood probabilities of the same magnitude. While there are
some exceptions to this pattern, particularly when probabilities
are extremely close to zero or one, there is a well-established aversion to facing imprecisely understood chances of a loss.
How this bias affects judgments is illustrated by experimental
results I obtained for a sample of state court judges. The judges
were asked, on behalf of a pharmaceutical company, to decide
between two different drugs that could be used as contrast
agents in a CAT scan. “Old Drug” had well-known properties

have nothing to gain from maiming their customers and employees,
willingly pay for cost-effective precautions…. Come the lawsuit, however, the passenger injured by a stop presents himself as a person, not
a probability. Jurors see today’s injury; persons who would be injured
if buttons were harder to find and use are invisible. Although witnesses may talk about them, they are spectral figures, insubstantial
compared to the injured plaintiff, who appears in the flesh.

Unfortunately, despite the well-established problems associated with hindsight bias, it is difficult for people to overcome
such biases when judging risky behaviors. To test the influence of hindsight bias, I examined the performance of judges
and jurors in a rail accident case in which different groups of
respondents were asked either to make the corporate risk-taking
decision ex ante or to judge the
corporation’s decision after an
accident had occurred. Judges
Unfortunately, despite the well-established problems
performed better than jurors in
associated with hindsight bias, it is difficult for people terms of aligning their ex ante
to overcome such biases when judging risky behaviors. risk decisions and their judgments after an accident had
occurred. However, in the jury
sample, participants favored
the risk-taking behavior before the accident occurred, but after
and offered a 1:100,000 chance that the patient would suffer a
an accident occurred levied punitive damages because the initial
fatal adverse reaction. “New Drug” served the same function,
decision to take the risk was regarded as reckless.
and based on clinical trials the best estimate of the expected
magnitude of the risk was 1:150,000. However, the risk posed by
New Drug was uncertain, as it could have been zero or as high as
Corporate Risk Analysis for Risky Products
1:50,000. Even though New Drug was safer based on the expected
level of risk, 57 percent of the respondents preferred to market
Ideally, companies marketing potentially risky products should
Old Drug. In discussions with the judges regarding their prefermake some assessment of the risk posed by the product, the
ence for the riskier but well known hazards of Old Drug, the
costs associated with improving product safety, and consumers’
judges indicated that there is less blame accorded to companies
likely valuations of products with different levels of safety to
that market risky products with well-known hazards than for
determine the efficient safety level for the product. At the most
newly emerging risks.
formal level, such an assessment would entail a benefit-cost
Another perceptional factor that influences people’s assessanalysis to determine the appropriate level of the risk.
ments of new products with uncertain properties is hindsight
While such assessments may be desirable in theory, in pracbias, which is the courtroom counterpart of Monday morning
tice they make the company very vulnerable. Having done a risk
quarterbacking. Product liability claims, by their very nature,
analysis and concluded that some risk-free or lower-risk variant
are filed after there has been an injury. At the time the product is
of the product is not desirable, the company will appear to have
marketed, the risk may be an uncertain prospect, but eventually
knowingly made a reckless decision to expose consumers to
the hazard becomes well known. Ideally, jurors should assess
risk if it turns out that there are product-related injuries. Thus
risks at the time the product is marketed. However, doing so
such analyses could serve as a trigger for the award of punitive
is difficult from a psychological standpoint. Once the adverse
damages instead of being treated as a component of responsible
event occurs, people tend to believe that the risk should have
corporate risk decisions.
been anticipated.
Such fears of harsh judgments against corporate risk analyThe tendency of people to overestimate the ex ante risk levels
ses have been borne out in a variety of major product liability
in legal contexts where there are identifiable victims was noted by
cases. The Ford Pinto cases involved drivers and passengers who
Judge Frank Easterbrook in Carroll v. Otis Elevator, a case involving
suffered burn injuries while in the car. In response to a governinjury on a department store escalator:
ment regulatory initiative from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Ford had done a risk analysis with respect to moving
the gas tank location, which would have affected the likelihood
The ex post perspective of litigation exerts a hydraulic force that disof burn injuries. Moving the tank to a safer location would have
torts judgment. Engineers design escalators to minimize the sum of
raised
the product price and Ford concluded the change would
construction, operation, and injury costs. Department stores, which
30
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not pass a benefit-cost test. After the injuries occurred, jurors
tended to compare the identifiable victims with the minor cost
of relocating the tank, whereas the more appropriate comparison would have been the expected benefits and costs before the
product was marketed.
Ford is not the only automobile company that has been pilloried for undertaking corporate risk analyses. In a blockbuster
punitive damages award case against the Chrysler Corporation,
jurors awarded punitive damages of $250 million because the
company had done a risk analysis of an allegedly defective door
latch in the Chrysler minivan. Chrysler maintained that the door
latch did not increase the risk significantly and that altering the
design was not worthwhile as it would have imposed a $100,000
fixed retooling cost and a $0.50 per vehicle parts cost. The plaintiff’s attorneys portrayed Chrysler as a corporate villain simply for
undertaking a risk analysis: “Chrysler officials at the highest level
cold-bloodedly calculated that acknowledging the problem and
fixing it would be more expensive, in terms of bad publicity and
lost sales, than concealing the defect and litigating the wrongful
death suits that inevitably would result.”
Experimental evidence indicates that undertaking a benefitcost analysis increases judgments against the corporation. In this
study, jurors were told that the company followed the same procedures used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
in assessing safety devices and that the company also used the same
value of statistical life (VSL) that the agency uses to value the safety
improvements of alternative designs. The VSL amount is greater
than the usual compensatory damages award for wrongful death,
and so one would expect a finding of no liability. However, the
mock juries levied punitive damages against the company. Thus
responsible corporate risk analysis has the perverse effect of boosting damages awards rather than reducing them.

Conclusion
Rather than creating an environment to foster safer products,
product liability law often has adverse consequences. Some of
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